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(#2A-9/10/85) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
( ^ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (GOVERNOR'S 
OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS). 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7748 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS. ESQ. (ROBERT E. WATERS. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (CLAUDIA R. 
McKENNA. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Governor's Office of Employee Relations of the State of 
New York (State) to the determination of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) that it violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor 
Law by unilaterally instituting a parcel inspection system at 
its Upstate Supply and Support Distribution Center (Center). 
The State acknowledges that it instituted a parcel inspection 
system at the Center without having negotiated this action 
with the Civil Service Employees Association. Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME. AFL-CIO (CSEA). the certified representative of 
the employees who work at the Center. It argues, however,: 
that its action is not violative of §209-a.l(d) because that 
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action constitutes a management prerogative not subject to 
mandatory negotiations. 
The Center is a large warehouse which normally contains 
goods, the aggregate value of which is about $5,000,000. A 
police investigation conducted in 1983 revealed a shortage of 
about $10,000 worth of goods, and the State initiated several 
measures to better increase security at the Center. Among 
those measures is a parcel inspection system which was 
instituted pursuant to a memorandum issued on August 12, 
1983, that provides: 
1. No packages, containers, or paper bags, 
etc.. will be removed from the Distribution 
Center by any employee or visitor unless 
checked by the security guard. 
2. Failure to comply with or attempts to 
circumvent these regulations can be the 
basis for appropriate disciplinary action. 
The parcel inspection system does not extend to purses or 
clothing pockets. 
In County of Rensselaer. 13 PERB 1P080 (1980), we had 
occasion to consider whether a similar, but not identical, 
parcel inspection system constituted a management 
prerogative, and we determined that it did not. The State 
urges us to distinguish Rensselaer, arguing that there are 
two important differences. 
The first difference addressed by the State is that the 
parcel inspection system in Rensselaer was instituted at a 
nursing home facility while here the facility is a 
warehouse. The State contends that this distinction is 
L 9888' 
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material because the mission of a nursing home is patient 
care while the mission of a warehouse is the security of the 
goods stored there. Thus, according to the State, its 
inspection plan was central to its mission while Rensselaer 
County's inspection plan was not. 
We are not persuaded by this contention. The legitimacy 
of a nursing home protecting itself against the theft of its 
property is no less than that of a warehouse. Indeed, the 
social justification for doing so may be greater as nursing 
homes stock controlled substances, while the record does not 
indicate that such substances are stored at the warehouse. 
Accordingly, we reject the State's first proposed distinction. 
The State's second contention is that its parcel 
inspection system is less intrusive than the one adopted in 
Rensselaer. Clearly, this is so. The State system calls for 
the inspection of certain types of parcels. The system 
adopted in Rensselaer went further. It instituted an 
internal pass system. Employees were required to obtain 
advance written permission to leave the premises with any 
type of parcel. This permission would be issued in 
duplicate, one copy of which would be given to the employee 
and a second to a security guard. In addition to inspecting 
the parcel, the security guard would compare the employee's 
copy of the parcel permission slip with his own. 
I. 9889 
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The difference between the two security systems is not 
great, but neither is it insignificant. We applied a 
balancing test in Rensselaer,— and are applying one here. 
Applying such a test, the facts sometimes indicate a clear 
2/ preponderance on one side or the other.— 
1/We said there: 
In determining whether a work rule is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation, the Board must strike a 
balance between an employer's freedom to manage its 
affairs and the right of employees to negotiate 
their terms and conditions of employment.i/ 
1/ In Newspaper Guild of Greater 
Philadelphia v. NLRB, F2d ; 89 LC 
1F12.207 (August 13, 1980), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
said: 
"[W]hen there is a conflict between 
an employer's freedom to manage his 
business in areas involving the basic 
direction of the enterprise and the 
right of employees to bargain on 
subjects which affect the terms and 
conditions of their employment, a 
balance must be struck, if possible, 
which will take account of the 
relative importance of the proposed 
actions to the two parties." 
(footnote and citations omitted.) 
^Compare Medicenter Mid-South Hospital. 221 NLRB No. 
105. 90 LRRM 1576 (1975). in which the NLRB found a 
unilateral imposition of polygraph tests for the purpose of 
combatting wide-spread vandalism to violate the employer's 
duty to bargain, with Master Slack Corp., 230 NLRB No. 138, 
96 LRRM 1309 (1977), in which the NLRB found that 
unilaterally imposed restrictions upon access to warehouse 
areas "did not rise to the level of a violation of the Act." 
The same management interest carried different weight when 
balanced against different levels of intrusiveness upon 
employees. 
* 9890 
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However, it is the nature of a balancing test that when the 
circumstances approach equipoise, subtle distinctions can 
shift the balance from one side to the other. 
The question in Rensselaer was a close one. We 
determined that the work rule, and its potential enforcement 
by discipline, had a substantial effect on terms and 
conditions of employment. On the other hand, there was a 
substantial management interest in securing its property. 
Considering all the circumstances in that case, we concluded 
that the interest of the employees predominated. 
In doing so, we relied, in part, upon a decision of the 
3/ NLRB— that the unilateral action of an employer in 
adopting an internal movement pass system applicable to the 
removal of property was a violation of its duty to 
negotiate. We therefore concluded that the combined parcel 
inspection and pass system instituted by the employer in 
Rensselaer crossed the line of management prerogatives and 
constituted improper unilateral action. We now determine 
that the security system imposed by the State which involves 
the inspection of parcels but does not include parcel permits 
does not cross that line. 
1/Boland Marine and Manufacturing Co.. 228 NLRB No. 
173, 94 LRRM 1743 (1977). enforced. NLRB v. Boland Marine 
and Manufacturing Co.. 84 LC iriO.826 (5th Cir. 1978). 
1.9891 
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ACCORDINGLY. WE REVERSE the decision of the ALJ. and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Sept emb er 10, 19 8 5 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. jSfewman, Chairman 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
( \ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
NEWBURGH, NEW YORK, INC.. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-7979 
CITY OF NEWBURGH. 
Charging Party. 
HAROLD & SALANT, ESQS. (CHRISTOPHER HAROLD. ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
HITSMAN & HOFFMAN. P.C. (JOHN F. O'REILLY. ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
: ) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was brought by the City of Newburgh 
(City). It complains that the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association of Newburgh, New York, Inc. (PBA) committed an 
improper practice by submitting a number of demands involving 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation to interest 
arbitration. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled on 
fourteen different demands. He dismissed the charge with 
respect to five of them on the ground that the demands in 
question were mandatory subjects of negotiation, and found 
merit in the other specifications of the charge because the 
• ) 
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remaining nine demands were nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation. 
PBA has filed exceptions with respect to all nine of the 
demands found to be nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
The City has filed exceptions with respect to four of the 
five demands found to be mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
We now deal with the issues presented by the contested 
demands. In doing so, we begin our analysis of the 
negotiability of each demand by quoting that demand. 
1. Those demands which the ALJ found to be mandatory 
subjects of negotiation: 
a. Demand #lla - Article VI, first paragraph 
Clarify contract so as to indicate all 
overtime at time-and-a-half in excess of 
eight hours a day or in excess of the 
normal weekly tour to be paid in money 
or compensatory time off. 
We conclude that the subject matter of this demand is 
preempted by the Fair Labor Standards Act. In Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, US , 83 
L.Ed. 2d 1016, 102 LC ir34.633 (1985), the Supreme Court held 
that the statute is applicable to state and local 
governments, and §7(k) of the statute permits compensatory 
time only during the pay period in which the overtime is 
worked. Accordingly, we hold that this demand is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Board - U-7979 -3 
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b. Demand #23 - Contract Article XIV 
Indemnification against liability 
provision should be expanded so as to 
include indemnification of acts 
committed in the discharge of duties 
outside the geographical territory of 
the employer and whether committed on 
or off duty. Protection shall include 
pay fox police officer's iegal 
representative of choice and shall 
include all litigation expenses. 
This demand is for indemnification against liability 
whether or not the liability is job related. The City 
argues that the subject matter is preempted by Public 
Officers Law §18.4 and General Municipal Law §50-j. both of 
which provide for indemnification under specified 
circumstances. 
We find that these statutory provisions do not 
preclude negotiations for other liability indemnification 
protections but merely prescribe minimum indemnification 
protections. Thus, the demand is merely one for legal 
insurance which is a form of compensation that has been 
held to be a mandatory subject of negotiation.— 
1/Town of Haverstraw. 11 PERB V3109 (1978). aff'd. 
Town of Haverstraw v. Newman. 75 AD 2d 879. 13 PERB 1[7006 
(2d Dept.. 1980); Albany Police Officers Union. 16 PERB 
ir3068 (1983). 
I. 9895 
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c. Demand #24 - Article XVI 
The grievance procedure shall be 
amended to provide that failure to hold 
a hearing and render a decision at the 
chief and/or city manager level within 
the time limit specified in the 
contract shall result in an automatic 
granting of the grievance. 
The City argues that since the grievance procedure is. 
by agreement of the parties, applicable to nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiation, this demand is not a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. We disagree. The thrust of the 
demand is exclusively procedural; it merely imposes time 
limits in the processing of grievances. The issue of what 
is grievable is not placed in question by either party. 
) 
Accordingly, the demand is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
d. Demand #32 - (No Reference) 
PBA president shall be assigned tour 
described in first paragraph of Article 
VI(D) of current contract. 
In Orange County Community College Faculty Association. 
10 PERB 1f3080 (1977). at p. 3136, we found a demand that "the 
employer would assign a teaching schedule that will maximize 
the [union] president's availability for performing official 
duties" to be a mandatory subject of negotiation. The 
principle underlying that decision is similar to the one 
j 
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underlying decisions of the NLRB and the courts in permitting 
superseniority for union officers in matters relating to 
layoffs and recall. Such superseniority has been held to be 
proper so long as it facilitates the performance of official 
responsibilities of the union officers which bear "a direct 
relationship to the effective and efficient representation of 
unit employees in implementing the collective bargaining 
2/ 
agreement.— The instant demand meets this test and is a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
2. Those demands which the ALJ found to be 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation: 
a. Demand #1 - Old contract except as 
amended. 
The ALJ determined that it is a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation because it is not restricted to provisions in the 
old contract that are themselves mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. In its exceptions, PBA argues that the demand 
cannot be declared a nonmandatory subject of negotiation 
merely because the terms of the old contract which would be 
extended to include a few nonmandatory provisions. Rather, 
it argues, the burden is on the City to indicate the 
provisions that should not be submitted to compulsory 
arbitration on the ground that those provisions are 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
2/D'Amido V. NLRB, 582 F 2d 820. 99 LRRM 2350. 2353 (3d 
Cir, 1978) enforcing Electrical Workers Local 623, 230 NLRB 
406. 95 LRRM 1343 (1977). 
r. 9S97 
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We affirm the decision of the ALJ in rejecting this 
argument. The demand is for the extension of both mandatory 
and nonmandatory provisions of the parties' past agreement. 
If this demand were included in the award of an arbitration 
panel, the City would be obligated to grant benefits that do 
not constitute mandatory subjects of negotiation, 
notwithstanding the absence of any waiver of its right not to 
be compelled to do so. In effect, PBA is arguing that the 
City's failure to identify the nonmandatory provisions of the 
parties' prior agreement constitutes such a waiver. However. 
3/ as noted by the 3d Department,— such a waiver must be 
clear and explicit, and no such waiver can be found here. 
v ) Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the ALJ that this 
demand is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
b. Demand #3 - Article II, Section C 
Detective position as permanent appointment 
with salary as set forth in schedule. 
We affirm the decision of the ALJ that this is not a 
subject of mandatory negotiation. Detective work is part of 
the essential work of police officers generally. Accordingly, 
I/CSEA V. PERB, 88 AD2d 685. 15 PERB 1T7011 (1982). 
affd. 61 NY2d 1001, 17 PERB 1f7007 (1984). 
r 9898 
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the assignment of such work to police officers is a management 
4/ prerogative.— 
c. Demand #llb - Article VI, second paragraph 
Subdivision "D" shall be modified so as to 
eliminate all training; and there shall be a 
Subdivision "E" which shall be captioned 
"Shift ~"Drf f:eT:e^ tiaT"'""and:"':shallL"'re"qu^ "re~ tfte" 
payment of 50 cents more per hour for those 
officers who worked the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 
p.m. or the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight 
shifts and 74 cents more per hour for those 
officers who worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 
a.m. or the 12:00 midnight to 8:00 a.m. 
shifts. All overtime earned during those 
periods shall be computed on a regular wage 
plus the shift differential. Taking of 
"Comp Time" at members' discretion. 
Unlimited accumulation. 
The ALJ determined that the paragraph constitutes a 
separate, "unitary" demand. A "unitary" demand is one that is 
not severable and therefore would be a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation en toto if any part of it is a nonmandatory subject 
5/ 
of negotiation.— 
If this is a unitary demand, it is not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation because it includes a requirement of "Comp 
Time", which, as we have already indicated, is precluded by the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. 
1/Compare Waverlv CSD. 10 PERB 1[3103 (1977). 
H/Pearl River UFSD. 11 PERB 1P085 (1978). 
f 9899 
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PBA argues that the demand is not a unitary one. The 
test, as articulated in Pearl River, 11 PERB ir3085 (1978), is 
whether the party making a demand presented its contents in 
such a manner as would reasonably indicate to the other party 
whether or not its contents were severable. As indicated by 
the discussion in that decision, it was anticipated that, at 
the very least, severable aspects of a single demand would be 
expressed in separate paragraphs. That was not done here, 
and we find no other evidence that PBA presented this demand 
in such a manner as to reasonably indicate to the City that 
its contents were severable. Accordingly, we determine that 
this demand is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
d. Demand #20 - Article X, Section E 
Increase personal leave to 8 days per 
calendar year. Newly hired personnel 
taking office any time after January 1st 
shall receive pro-rata share of the 
personal leave days allowed for that year 
for all other officers. Selection of 
personal days at member's discretion. 
Eliminate Chief's discretion on personal 
days carryover. 
This demand was declared a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation by the ALJ because it provides, in part, for the 
selection of personal leave days at the sole discretion of 
the employees. It seeks a change from the current practice 
which is that the choice of times for personal leave is 
subject to approval of the police chief. The ALJ concluded 
F. 9900 
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that the proposal would interfere with the City's exercise 
its right to determine the number of police officers who 
should be on duty at any time. 
We agree. In City of Yonkers, 10 PERB ir3056 (1977). 
this Board said. p. 3099. that a public employer 
may determine the number of unit employees 
that it must have on duty during each of the 
vacation periods. Within that framework, it 
is obligated to negotiate over the order in 
which vacation preferences may be granted. 
The same is true about personal leave. However, this 
demand goes beyond the framework within which the order of 
preferences for granting personal leave may be negotiated. 
In the typically sensitive area of the performance of 
police functions, it would eliminate entirely management 
participation in the decision as to whether a particular 
employee could be spared from duty at the time sought for 
personal leave, and it would also eliminate all management 
control over the number of employees on personal leave at 
any one time. Accordingly, it is not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation. 
e. Demand #25 - Article XVIII 
Eliminate management's rights clause. 
The ALJ determined that the management rights clause 
the prior agreement deals "almost exclusively" with 
management prerogatives. Indeed, in its brief to us, the 
City asserts that the clause covers nothing but management 
prerogatives. 
A 
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A demand for the elimination of provisions of a 
management rights clause which deals only with mandatory 
subjects of negotiation is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. However, to the extent that it deals with 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation, neither the elimination 
nor the continuation of such a management right constitutes a 
6 / 
mandatory subject of negotiation.— Past negotiations, or 
even agreements as to a matter that is not a mandatory 
subject of negotiation "do not oblige the parties to 
7/ 
negotiate over such a matter subsequently."— It follows 
that to the extent that it contains nonmandatory items, a 
clause cannot be included in the parties' contract, except 
upon the agreement of both parties. It also follows that the 
demand herein is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
ii/As to the absence of a duty to negotiate for the 
continuation of a contract clause dealing with nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiation, see our ruling on item 2, a 
(Demand #1). supra. 
1/state of New York, 6 PERB ir3005 at p. 3021 (1973). 
See also Troy Uniformed Firefighters. 10 PERB 1[3015 (1977) 
in which we said, at p. 3031: 
Parties may negotiate over nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiation and are encouraged 
to do so. However, in doing so they do 
not alter the character of a demand from 
nonmandatory to mandatory; neither do they 
obligate themselves to negotiate over such 
a matter in the future, (footnote omitted) 
Board - U-7979 -11 
f. Demand #26 - Article XIX 
Add new provision to bill of rights 
clause which shall permit up to 90 days 
for the department to investigate a 
civilian complaint lodged against an 
officer of the department within which 
time he shall be either officially 
charged or officially absolved. There 
shall also be a new subdivision 
mandating that each officer shall 
receive an hour meal time with pay for 
each 4 hour period thereafter. 
The ALJ determined this to be a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation because it extends to investigations of criminal 
conduct. 
While PBA states that the demand is not intended to 
apply to criminal conduct unrelated to internal police 
department discipline, this is irrelevant. Mandatory 
collective bargaining cannot reach police department 
investigations of criminal conduct even if the criminal 
conduct is related to internal police department 
8 / 
discipline.— To hold otherwise would be to require a 
police department to negotiate with respect to a major part 
of its mission — the investigation of crimes. 
g. Demand #27 - Article XX 
There shall be only one personnel file 
relative to each police officer. This 
language is in addition to the existing 
language. 
J?/see Police Association of Mew Rochelle. Inc., 
10 PERB 1P042 (1977) . 
I. 9903 
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PBA argues that the sole purpose of the demand is to 
preclude "secret" personnel files. On its face, however, the 
demand would preclude the maintenance of duplicate personnel 
files; thus, the City would be prohibited from maintaining 
one file at a central personnel office and a second at the 
location where the employee works. The manner in which the 
City chooses to maintain its personnel files is not a term or 
condition of employment. 
In the past, this Board has been lenient in permitting 
unions to clarify demands even as late as in their 
9/ 
exceptions.— Here, however, we have something more than 
the clarification of a demand. As explained by PBA, the 
demand has been given a meaning so different from that which 
is implied by its wording as to make it a new demand. We do 
not understand the demand as having the meaning now given it 
by PBA. Furthermore, even if we did, it would not be subject 
to interest arbitration now because it has not yet been 
considered in collective negotiations.— 
h. Demand #29 - New Article 
Each provision of the contract which 
affords benefits of (sic) the members of 
the bargaining unit shall specifically 
-/in City of Saratoga Springs. 16 PERB 1P058 (1983), 
we held, at p. 3092, that a demand, "as clarified in the 
exceptions," was a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
!P-/compare Binqhamton Fire Fighters, 9 PERB 1P072 
(1976). 
* 9904 
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state that such benefits are to continue 
for those members who are on injury under 
Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law. 
This demand cannot be found to be a nonmandatory 
subject of negotiation on the ground that it duplicates the 
provisions of GML §207-c. That statute deals with 
salaries, wages and medical and hospital expenses while the 
contract provides additional benefits. However, the ALJ 
ruled that the use of the word "benefits" implies that the 
demand incorporates nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
The source for this position is this Board's decision in 
Hudson Valley Community College. 12 PERB 1P030 (1979). 
That case involved a demand "to maintain all terms and 
j conditions of employment in effect until the negotiation of 
a successor agreement . . . ." This Board said, at p. 
3058, "the demand is for the maintenance of 'terms and 
conditions of employment1 and the Taylor Law uses this 
phrase to denote mandatory subjects of negotiation . . . ." 
That decision did not make the phrase "terms and 
conditions of employment" the sine qua non of a 
continuation of benefits clause, but. in Police Association 
of Mount Vernon. • 13 PERB ir4582 (1980). at p. 4640, an ALJ 
found a demand to be nonmandatory which provided that 
"[a]ll other benefits being enjoyed by the members shall be 
continued unless specifically amended by this agreement" 
because it was not limited to "terms and conditions of 
y
 employment". While we affirmed her decision based upon the 
r 9905 
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particular facts in that case.— we did not intend to 
take as restricted a view of continuation of benefit 
clauses as she did. Indeed, in Lynbrook PBA. 10 PERB ir3067 
(1977). at p. 3121-3122. we held a demand to be a mandatory 
subject of negotiation which provided that M[u]pon the 
expiration of the contract, all terms, conditions. 
benefits, etc., shall continue until a new contract is 
signed." (emphasis supplied). Similarly, we rule that the 
demand herein is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
i. Demand #30 - (No Reference) 
Incorporate all addenda into formal 
collective bargaining agreement. 
The ALJ found this to be a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation because the addenda include nonmandatory 
matters. PBA argues that the ALJ had a more expansive view 
of the addenda intended for incorporation than was 
contemplated by the demand. In its exceptions it identified 
eight specific addenda for incorporation into the new 
agreement, and it claims that these are all mandatory 
subjects of negotiation. 
Wholly apart from the question of whether the position 
taken by PBA in its exceptions constitutes a clarification or 
an amendment of its demand, the demand is a nonmandatory 
subject of negotiation. The very first addendum which PBA 
ii/l3 PERB 1P071 (1980). 
i 9906 
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explicitly seeks to incorporate in the contract deals with 
interrogation sessions by superior officers and does not 
exclude interrogation sessions involving criminal conduct. 
As such, it is not a mandatory subject of negotiation because 
it goes to a major part of the mission of the police 
. . 12/ department — the investigation of crimes.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE FIND that PBA committed an improper 
practice by submitting to interest 
arbitration Demands 1, 3, 11a, lib, 20. 
25, 26, 27 and 30; and 
WE ORDER it to withdraw such demands 
from interest arbitration. 
WE FURTHER ORDER that, in all other 
respects, the charge herein be. and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 10, 1985 
Albany, New York 
WM4^x 
arold R. Newman. Chairman 
IMsv^ £ 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
12/see our ruling on item 2. f (Demand #26). supra 
If" 
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OPINION OF BOARD MEMBER DAVID C. RANDLES 
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART 
I concur in the majority opinion except with respect to 
Item 2, d (Demand #20), which the majority declared a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation on the ground that a 
provision for the selection of personal leave days at the sole 
discretion of employees would interfere with the City's 
exercise of its right to determine the number of police who 
should be on duty at any time. I believe that the Board 
majority has failed to distinguish between the City's 
unilateral right to determine its manpower requirements and its 
Taylor Law obligation to negotiate the "manipulation of 
1/ 
schedules of individuals and groups . , ."— in order to 
satisfy those requirements. This Board determined that the 
2/ latter is a mandatory subject of negotiation.— 
The demand herein does not preclude the City from 
determining its manpower needs and satisfying those needs. If 
adopted, however, it could impose an administrative and 
financial burden upon the City. In situations where employees' 
exercise of personal leave rights would diminish the number of 
I/City of White Plains, 5 PERB ^3008 (1972) at p. 
3015. 
2/ld. 
- 9908 
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employees on duty to less than that deemed essential by the 
City, the City would be required to solicit volunteers for 
overtime or to call in employees to fill vacancies. For 
example, under the parties' past agreement, which may be 
continued, unit employees who are called in for work or who 
accept voluntary overtime must be assured a minimum of four 
hours pay at premium rates. Burdens such as these, however, 
are typical of those that are dealt with in collective 
negotiations; the issues that they raise go to the merits of 
the demand rather than to its negotiability. 
I have a further concern. By reserving to management the 
right to approve or reject applications for personal leave in 
order to maintain manning levels, the majority decision may. in 
effect, have permitted management to render personal leave 
clauses a nullity. 
I would hold this demand to be a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. INC., 
Respondent, 
-and- -• .-- CASE NOS-. U-7449 
and U-7482 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. INC.. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-776 5 
MORRIS E. ESON, 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD F. ASHE. ESQ. (ROCCO A. SOLIMANDO, ESQ. and 
IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ. ESQ.. of Counsel), for respondent 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro se 
MORRIS E. ESON. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These matters come to us on the exceptions of Thomas C. 
Barry and Morris E. Eson to the consolidated decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dated May 23. 1985, in which 
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he dismissed all charges in their entirety.— 
Barry filed two charges against the United University 
Professions, Inc. (UUP), alleging that the union violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act because its agency fee refund 
procedure for 1983-84 and subsequent fiscal years permits UUP 
and its affiliates to use a portion of his agency shop fee 
funds temporarily for political and ideological purposes. 
Eson filed a similar charge alleging an improper practice in 
that UUP failed to escrow 100% of his agency fees pending an 
independent determination of the amount actually expended by 
UUP for refundable purposes. Both argue that even the 
possibility of temporary use of part of their deduction for 
political or ideological causes is violative of their 
rights.— 
A brief recapitulation of the history of the two Barry 
cases is necessary. Originally, the Director dismissed the 
charges (17 PERB V4570; 17 PERB 1F4580) . On appeal, we issued 
an interim decision (17 PERB 1f3066), in which we determined 
that, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship 
i/The ALJ's consolidated decision included 
consideration of a charge filed in Case No. U-7793, Middle 
Country Teachers Association, NYSUT. AFT, AFL-CIO and Joseph 
Werner. Joseph Werner has not filed exceptions to the 
dismissal of his charge. 
^Werner' s charge was to the same effect. 
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Clerks, Freight Handlers. Express and Station Employees. 
U.S. . 17 PERB ir7511 (1984). reexamination of the 
propriety of UUP's refund procedure was warranted. We 
invited Barry and UUP to submit memoranda of law concerning 
the effect of Ellis and whether alternative procedures were 
now required. 
In July. 1984, after our interim decision. UUP amended 
its agency fee procedure for its 1984-85 and subsequent 
fiscal years. The refund procedure in effect at the dates 
the charges were filed provided for a demand and return after 
the close of UUP's fiscal year. Under the amended procedure, 
nonmembers who file an objection are issued a check by UUP 
during the current fiscal year representing UUP's 
approximation of the expenditures it and its affiliates will 
make during that year for refundable activities. Under the 
procedure as written, the approximation is based upon "the 
latest fiscal year for which there is a completed and 
available audit". After the year-end audit, the actual 
expenditures for refundable purposes are calculated and 
adjustments to the advance reduction are made as 
appropriate. If the amount tendered to the objector exceeds 
the amount finally determined to be owed, the procedure 
provides that the objector shall refund the overpayment to 
the UUP. Alternatively, additional monies are tendered to 
the objector if the advance reduction check is less than the 
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amount determined to be owed. The final determination is 
subject to appeal to the UUP's Executive Board and then to a 
neutral appointed by the UUP. These steps are the same as 
those earlier approved by us. 
After receiving submissions from Barry and UUP. including 
a description of UUP's amended procedure, we issued a 
decision on September 19. 1984 (17 PERB ir3098). In that 
decision, we held that our earlier approval of UUP's refund 
procedure should be overruled by virtue of the Supreme 
Court's holding in Ellis that a "pure rebate approach is 
inadequate". We further held that a refund procedure can be 
valid under §208.3 of the Taylor Law only if the agency shop 
fee. in its entirety, is held in an escrow account. 
In so holding, we rejected, as inadequate, the UUP's 
revised refund procedure which contemplated an advance 
reduction of the fee. We directed UUP to place all agency 
fee payments in an interest-bearing escrow account to be 
maintained until a final determination of the amount of 
refund, at which time UUP could make a distribution of the 
escrow account in accordance with such final determination. 
On October 9, 1984, we issued a supplementary decision 
(17 PERB ir3101), in which we withdrew our order in the two 
cases and remanded them to the Director for further 
proceedings. On our own motion, we determined that "while 
our overruling of UUP (Eson) was appropriate, we acted 
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prematurely insofar as we addressed the merits of the 
charges, found a violation and issued a remedial order." We 
recognized that UUP had not yet been given an opportunity to 
file an answer to the charges and to present whatever 
evidence it believed was warranted. The cases were remanded 
to consider the merits of the charges. 
On May 23, 1985, the ALJ issued his decision (18 PERB 
ir4575), in which he dismissed all the charges. The ALJ 
concluded that although Ellis made a "pure rebate approach" 
improper, the Ellis decision is not dispositive of the 
question of the proper interpretation of §208.3. He 
determined that §208.3 does not bar an advance reduction 
method as part of the refund procedure, nor. in his opinion, 
does §208.3 mandate 100% escrow of all agency fee monies 
collected by the union. Accordingly, he found that UUP's 
amended refund procedure is not violative of the Act in this 
regard. 
In his exceptions, Barry asserts that any procedure which 
allows, or has the possibility of allowing, his agency shop 
monies to be used for improper purposes, must be found 
invalid. He takes exception to several of the comments and 
analyses of the ALJ which support the ALJ's ultimate 
conclusion that a refund procedure under §208.3 may contain 
an advance reduction method and need not contain a 
requirement for the escrow of all of the funds of the agency 
fee payer. Barry urges that this Board should reinstate our 
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order of September 19, 1984. Eson's exceptions are to the 
same effect. Specific contentions are made with regard to 
aspects of the ALJ's analyses, but his basic position appears 
to be that to be both constitutional and consistent with the 
requirements of §208.3. an agency shop refund procedure must 
provide that all agency fee money be placed in an escrow 
account and that such monies can be released to the union 
only as, and when, it is necessary for expenditures allowed 
by the Ellis decision. In effect, he also urges that the 
union may not use any of the agency fee monies, even 
temporarily, for refundable purposes. 
UUP's response supports the decision of the ALJ. It 
argues that the Ellis decision, being solely an 
interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, is not controlling. 
It argues further that §208.3 does not mandate any particular 
refund procedure and that an advance reduction of agency fees 
prior to the final internal UUP determination is consistent 
with §208.3. It also urges that even though the refund 
procedure applicable to the 1983-84 fiscal year may have been 
a "pure rebate" procedure, the type which the Ellis decision 
found to be improper, this Board should not penalize UUP by 
way of special remedy because of its failure to anticipate 
the Supreme Court's Ellis decision. The Civil Service 
Employees Association. Inc. also filed an amicus brief in 
support of the ALJ's decision. 
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DISCUSSION 
Upon further consideration, we conclude that §208.3 of 
the Act can be satisfied by a refund procedure that 
incorporates an advance reduction method. Accordingly, we 
dismiss the charges in the cases before us. 
Although the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in Ellis 
ostensibly construed only the provisions of the Railway Labor 
Act. we believe the Court's analysis, especially in the light 
3/ 
of its earlier decisions involving the same statute.— 
indicates the constitutional considerations which must govern 
our construction of §208.3. We continue to believe, on the 
basis of the Ellis decision, that §208.3 cannot 
constitutionally authorize an agency shop refund procedure 
which is based on a "pure rebate approach". Thus, we 
reaffirm our earlier holding (17 PERB 1P098) that our 
decision in UUP (Eson). 11 PERB 1f3074 (1981), in which we 
approved such a "pure rebate approach", must be overruled. 
In Ellis, the Supreme Court suggested alternatives to the 
pure rebate approach, including the use of advance reduction 
methods and/or interest-bearing escrow accounts. Although 
^Railway Employees Department v. Hanson. 351 U.S. 225 
(1956); International Association of Machinists v. Street, 
367 U.S. 740 (1961); Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship 
Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963). Of great significance, 
of course, is Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 
209 (1977). 
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the matter is not entirely free from doubt, we do not read 
the Ellis decision as sanctioning the use of escrow accounts 
only when the union deposits 100% of the agency fee of 
objecting nonmembers in such accounts. Inasmuch as the Court 
indicated that an advance reduction of the agency fee is an 
acceptable alternative, it would seem that the escrow 
alternative similarly can apply to a portion of the fee. We 
now believe that the Ellis alternatives to the impermissible 
pure rebate approach apply only to that portion of the fees 
which are to be used for purposes outside the scope of the 
statutory authorization. 
The charging parties strongly urge that any procedure 
which permits the possibility of any part of the refundable 
portion to be used by the union, even temporarily, is 
objectionable and cannot be approved. Indeed, this 
contention appears to be supported by the Supreme Court's 
statment in Ellis that "given the existence of acceptable 
alternatives, the union cannot be allowed to commit 
dissenters' funds to improper uses even temporarily". The 
charging parties argue, therefore, that the only procedure 
which can fully protect their rights is one which requires 
the deposit of 100% of their agency fee deductions in an 
interest-bearing escrow account until the final determination 
of the proper refund. 
While we have previously accepted such an approach, we 
now conclude that it is not required, either by Ellis or by 
9917 
Board - U-7449. U-7482 and U-7765 -9 
§208.3. Theoretically at least, any partial escrow, as well 
as any advance reduction method, can result in some portion 
of the agency fee being used temporarily by the union for 
rebatable purposes. Nevertheless, Ellis accepts both of 
these alternatives to the pure rebate approach. We conclude, 
therefore, that the Supreme Court did not intend to accord 
absolute protection to the objecting nonmembers' interests, 
but, rather, required that the procedure chosen by a union 
should provide reasonable assurance that agency fees will not 
be used by the union in a manner which violates the objecting 
nonmembers1 rights. 
In construing the Taylor Law. the ALJ properly noted that 
Ellis is not dispositive of the statutory interpretation 
necessary to be made in this matter. The Legislature, when 
it enacted §208.3, could have imposed more stringent 
requirements upon agency fee recipients than is contemplated 
by Ellis. We now conclude, however, that §208.3 does not 
foreclose the use of an advance reduction method as part of 
an acceptable refund procedure. 
While §208.3, by its terms, can only be satisfied by a 
refund procedure, the statute does not mandate any particular 
form of procedure.— The statute should be construed as 
permitting any refund procedure, including the incorporation 
of the Ellis alternatives, which accords appropriate 
4/see UUP (Barry), 15 PERB V3130 (1982). 
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protection to the interests of nonmembers. So long as the 
procedure gives reasonable assurance that agency fees will 
not be used by the union in a manner which violates objecting 
nonmembers' rights, the provisions of §208.3 do not bar an 
otherwise reasonable refund procedure solely because the 
procedure incorporates an advance reduction method. 
While advance reduction is permitted under §208.3, not 
every procedure for its implementation is necessarily 
acceptable. Our decision herein should not be construed as 
necessarily approving all aspects of UUP's advance reduction 
method as incorporated in its refund procedure. The charges 
in these cases do not challenge specific elements of that 
method. Nor has UUP been asked to address possible concerns 
with particular aspects of its procedure. It would be 
premature, therefore, for us to consider whether the UUP 
procedure is, in its entirety, an acceptable advance 
reduction method. 
We would, however, note that any method selected by a 
union must provide reasonable assurance that the interests of 
the objecting nonmembers are protected. Any such procedure 
should be designed to avoid the "involuntary loan" to which 
the Supreme Court objected. Attention must, therefore, be 
directed to the timing of the advance reduction determination 
and its implementation, as well as the basis upon which the 
amount of the advance reduction is determined. Other aspects 
may also be subject to further scrutiny. 
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In regard to the other contentions of the charging 
parties, we find that the ALJ has properly disposed of them, 
and we adopt his conclusions. 
Finally, we agree that a remedial order is not warranted 
by virtue of the fact that UUP maintained a pure refund 
procedure for its 1983-84 fiscal year. In particular, 
charging parties urge that since the procedure did not 
satisfy the Ellis requirements, we should issue an order 
requiring UUP to refund all agency fees collected by it for 
the 1983-84 year. We have previously rejected such a remedy 
(17 PERB ir3098). and, for the reasons stated in the cited 
decision, we conclude that, under all of the circumstances 
disclosed by this record, it would not effectuate the 
policies of the Act to order such a remedy. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charges herein be. and 
they hereby are. dismissed. 
DATED: September 10, 1985 
Albany, New York 
CL^yx^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^ • / T 2 ^ " ' 
David C. Randies, Member a T 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membei 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF ALEXANDRIA. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2928 
TRUCK DRIVERS AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION 
NO. 687. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS. WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Truck Drivers and Helpers 
Local Union No. 687. International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 
Chauffeurs. Warehousemen and Helpers of America has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Motor equipment operators. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Truck Drivers and Helpers 
Local Union No. 687, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the above 
unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of, 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: September 10, 1985 
Albany. New York 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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Public Employment Relations Board 
TEXT OF PROPOSED RULE 
Text of Proposed Rule: The Public Employment Relations Board, pursuant 
to the author ity vested in i t by Civi 1 Sery ice Law•_, Article_ 14,_, Section 
205.5, at its regularly scheduled meeting held at Albany, New York, on 
June 18, 1985, resolved to amend the rules of such Board, 4 HYCRR, Cha-
pter VII, as follows: 
Subdivision (e) of Rule Section 201.3 is hereby amended to read as fol-
- - • \ 
lows: • * 
(e) A petition for certification or decertification may 
be filed by an employee organization other than the recognized or cert-
ified employee organization and a petition for decertification may be 
filed by one or more public employees, if no new agreement is negotiat-
ed, 120 days subsequent to the expiration of a written agreement betwe-
en the public employer and the recognized or certified employee organi-
zation or, if the agreement does not expire at the end of the employer's 
-^ fiscal year, then 120 days subsequent to the end of the fiscal year im-
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mediately prior to the termination date of such agreement. Thereafter, 
;
 ) 
such a petition may be filed until a new agreement is executed. Such 
a petition shall be supported by 'a showing • interest of at least 30% of 
* showing of interest * 
the employees in the unit already in e*iafcanca or alleged to be approp-
* existence * 
rlate by the petitioner. 
Subdivision (b) of Rule Section 203,8 is hereby amended to read as fol-
lows: 
(b) 'Petitions: Filing, A petition to review the ques-
tion of whether provisions and procedures of a local government are be-
( I ) 
ing implemented in a manner substantially equivalent to the provisions 
and procedures set forth in the Act and these Rules (hereinafter called 
a petition for review) may be filed by any person. Petitions under th-
is section shall be in writing and signed. Four copies of the petition 
shall be filed with the Board [within sixty days after "the act or inac-
tion complained of occurred or failed to occur]. petition forms will 
be supplied by the Board upon request. The petition may be withdrawn 
only with the consent of the Board. Whenever the Board approves withd-
~rawal of any petition, the case shall be closed. 
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Subdivision (c) of Rule Section 203.8 is hereby anended to read as fol-
) 
lows: 
(c) Time for Filing of Petitions. A petition~for revi-
ew may be filed [at any time] vithin sixty days after the act or inact-
ion compXained of occurred or failed to occur. 
'Rule Section 204.11 is hereby amended to read as follows: 
204.11 Cross-Exceptions. Within seven working days af-
t 
ter [receipt] service of exceptions, any party may file an original and 
four copies of a response thereto or cross-exceptions and a brief in s 
J 
upport thereof, together with proof of service of copies of" these c Crete 
Bents upon each party to the proceeding. 
* documents * 
A 
i 
-3- 9925 
